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 Policy scenarios for decarbonising of the global electricity sector by 90%.
 Strong synergies exist between different energy policy instruments.
 Carbon pricing not a sufficient policy instrument for large emissions reductions.
 Improved agent behaviour assumptions for energy modelling beyond cost-optimisation.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper presents an analysis of climate policy instruments for the decarbonisation of the global
electricity sector in a non-equilibrium economic and technology diffusion perspective. Energy markets
are driven by innovation, path-dependent technology choices and diffusion. However, conventional
optimisation models lack detail on these aspects and have limited ability to address the effectiveness of
policy interventions because they do not represent decision-making. As a result, known effects of
technology lock-ins are liable to be underestimated. In contrast, our approach places investor decision-
making at the core of the analysis and investigates how it drives the diffusion of low-carbon technology
in a highly disaggregated, hybrid, global macroeconometric model, FTT:Power-E3MG. Ten scenarios to
2050 of the electricity sector in 21 regions exploring combinations of electricity policy instruments are
analysed, including their climate impacts. We show that in a diffusion and path-dependent perspective,
the impact of combinations of policies does not correspond to the sum of impacts of individual
instruments: synergies exist between policy tools. We argue that the carbon price required to break the
current fossil technology lock-in can be much lower when combined with other policies, and that a 90%
decarbonisation of the electricity sector by 2050 is affordable without early scrapping.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The electricity sector emits 38% of global energy-related green-
house gases (GHGs, IEA, 2012b). Investment planning in the
electricity sector is therefore of critical importance to climate-
change policy. Electricity production is an energy sector with some
of the longest time scales for technological change, requiring
particularly careful planning in order to avoid locking in, for many
decades, to heavily emitting systems that could commit society to
dangerous levels of global warming (Barker et al., 2007; Edenhofer
et al., 2014). Meeting emissions targets to prevent warming
beyond 2 1C significantly restricts the number of possible path-
ways of energy sector development (Rogelj et al., 2013). However,
warming beyond 2 1C is likely to lead to catastrophic consequences
for global ecosystems and food chains, with important repercus-
sions for global human welfare (Field et al., 2014; Parry et al.,
2007). Large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions involve
significant amounts of technology substitution, most likely large
scale socio-technical transitions (as defined by Geels, 2002).
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Results of techno-economic studies of climate change mitiga-
tion depend strongly on assumptions made concerning technology
dynamics (Löschel, 2002). The majority of studies of energy
systems are made using either bottom-up cost-optimisation, or
top-down general equilibrium utility optimisation (equilibrium)
computational models, or a combination of both. In these models,
however, dynamics result mostly from the assumptions about
optimisation that underpin the modelling approaches.
In stark contrast with more traditional optimisation-based
approaches, this work proposes a new modelling paradigm based
exclusively on non-equilibrium dynamics to simulate the impacts
of specific policy frameworks, through the economy, onto the
environment. We present an analysis of the global electricity
sector with high resolution simulations of technology diffusion
dynamics, using the ‘Future Technology Transformations’ frame-
work (FTT:Power),1 coupled with non-equilibrium macroeco-
nomics (E3MG),2 and environmental impacts derived by
combining emulators of the climate system (PLASIM-ENTSem)
and the carbon cycle (GENIEem).3
Uncoordinated technology dynamics are modelled at the level
of diverse profit-seeking investor decisions incentivised by policy
under bounded rationality, as opposed to system level optimisa-
tion. This setup enables us to explore the outcomes of particular
energy policy tools for technology diffusion, electricity generation,
global emissions, climate change and macroeconomic change. The
connection of a diffusion framework to a non-equilibrium model
of the global economy opens a very rich world of macroeconomic
dynamics and technological change where the impacts of energy
policy reveal complex interactions between the energy sector and
the economy.
Ten scenarios of the future global power sector up to 2050 are
presented, creating a storyline to provide insight for the construc-
tion of effective comprehensive energy policy portfolios in the
context of non-equilibrium dynamics. Going beyond carbon pri-
cing only and considering other policies that could help trigger the
diffusion of new technologies, particular combinations are found
to feature mutual synergies that provide suitable environments for
fast electricity sector decarbonisation: up to 90% by 2050. Macro-
economic dynamics in these scenarios are summarised. High
resolution scenario data are accessible on our website at www.
4cmr.group.cam.ac.uk/research/FTT/fttviewer, where costs, electri-
city generation and emissions can be explored in 21 world regions
and 24 technologies.
Decarbonisation involves the positive externality associated to
the global accumulation of knowledge and experience in scaling
up, deploying and using new power technologies. A classic
collective action problem emerges: learning cost reductions for
new technologies may only become significant and enable cost-
effective diffusion when most nations of the world demonstrate
strong coordinated dedication to their deployment. We show that
carbon pricing covering all world regions is a necessary but
insufficient component for the success of mitigation action in
order to break the current fossil fuel technology lock-in, unless the
price is very high.
As has been shown earlier (Barker and Scrieciu, 2010), in the
disequilibrium perspective, reductions in power sector emissions
may not necessarily imply significant macroeconomic costs (direct
and indirect) but, instead, could generate additional industrial
activity and employment.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Review of the literature
The great majority of studies of energy systems at the global
scale are made using cost-optimisation computational models (a
social planner approach).4 Meanwhile, the economics of climate
change are often represented using general equilibrium economic
theories5 (fully rational agent behaviour, perfect foresight and
information, carried out by a representative agent, and some
variations within these concepts, see Edenhofer et al., 2006,
2010; Löschel, 2002, for reviews of models), which tend to yield
negative macroeconomic impacts of climate change mitigation,
one could argue, by construction.6 In both these approaches,
which together represent the current methodological standard,
the assumptions about the nature of agents make the optimisation
problem involved tractable. These assumptions about the nature of
behaviour, however, may over-simplify aspects of an inherently
complex global energy–economic system that are crucial for
climate change mitigation, leaving open the question as to how
much results stem from these simplifications, and whether relax-
ing these constraints changes perspectives.
Cost-optimisation technology models, in normative mode, are
still the most powerful tools for finding detailed, lowest-cost
future technology pathways that reach particular objectives. If
used for descriptive purposes, they imply a description of agents
(investors, consumers) as identical, who possess a degree of
information and technology access as well as foresight sufficient
to generate pathways that are cost-optimal at the system level,
which alternatively corresponds to a controlled degree of coordi-
nation between all actors involved in the evolution of the system.7
As stated in the Global Energy Assessment (ch. 17, Riahi et al.,
2012), “A fundamental assumption underlying the pathways is that
the coordination required to reach the multiple objectives simulta-
neously can be achieved”. While this approach generates a sig-
nificant simplification to a highly complex system, it may be
argued that such a spontaneous emergence of coordination is
somewhat unlikely. For instance liberalised energy markets
involve actors free to take their investment and consumption
decisions based on their particular circumstances, and are only
incentivised by policy. Thus while optimisation frameworks are
valuable for identifying feasible and cost-effective pathways that
reach particular objectives at the system level, they do not suggest
how exactly to achieve them from a policy standpoint, because
they do not specifically model decision making by diverse agents.
Strong coordination is difficult to generate from economic policy
instruments, leading to sub-optimal outcomes and technology
lock-ins.
Meanwhile, equilibrium economic theory implies that climate
change mitigation costs are borne at the expense of consumption
1 Future Technology Transformations in the Power sector (Mercure, 2012),
www.4cmr.group.cam.ac.uk/research/esm.
2 The Energy–Economy–Environment Model at the Global level (E3MG/E3ME
Barker and Scrieciu, 2010), www.e3mgmodel.com, www.e3me.com. E3MG and
E3ME are variants of the same model with different regional and sectoral
classifications/resolution.
3 Planet Simulator – Efficient Numerical Terrestrial Scheme – Emulator
(PLASIMENTSem, Holden et al., 2014), Grid Enabled Integrated Earth systems
model – Emulator (GENIEem, Holden et al., 2013).
4 For instance those based on the MARKAL/TIMES/TIAM family of models (IEA/
ETSAP, 2012; Seebregts et al., 2001), some variants of the MESSAGE model from
IIASA (Messner and Strubegger, 1995), the AIM model from NIES in Japan (NIES,
2012), REDGEM70 (Takeshita, 2011, 2012), DNE21þ (RITE, 2012) and many more.
5 Neoclassical, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE), Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) and other variations.
6 For instance in the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2010), mitigation costs are
subtracted from GDP. In standard CGE models, due to ‘crowding out’, investments
equal to those of mitigation are lost to the economy, see Section 3.5.
7 Minimising total system cost as opposed to minimising individual project
costs, the level where decisions take place.
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or investment elsewhere,8 leading to detrimental economic
impacts, which are not universally agreed to occur (Barker and
Scrieciu, 2010; Grubb et al., 2014). In particular, equilibrium theory
relies on decreasing or constant returns to scale, and becomes
unstable in the presence of processes with increasing returns such
as induced technological change (Arthur, 1989). Increasing returns
also imply the property of path dependence and involve complex-
ity, where new ordering principles can emerge from the interac-
tions between system parts (Arrow et al., 1995; Anderson, 1972).
Since path dependent systems may not return to equilibrium after
disturbances, scenarios diverge from each other for small differ-
ences of starting parameters, in a similar way to physical models of
the climate.
Equilibrium economic analyses recommend carbon pricing as
the single most efficient policy tool to fix the climate market
failure, when equated to the social cost of emitting carbon.
However, it is recognised that some new technologies might not
successfully bridge the technology innovation ‘valley of death’ to
the marketplace at politically acceptable carbon prices without
further government support (Grubb et al., 2014; Murphy and
Edwards, 2003). Deriving future scenarios using normative models
and equilibrium economics is conceptually inconsistent with the
simulation approach of climate science, and hence potentially
misleading for many important stakeholders.
A simulation approach without systems optimisation is possi-
ble using known technology dynamics and a model for decision-
making at the firm level by diverse agents (Mercure, 2012).
Empirically repeatable dynamics are known to exist in scaling up
technology systems (e.g. S-shaped diffusion), and their costs
(learning curves), which have been extensively studied for decades
(see the summary and analyses by Grübler, 1998; Grübler et al.,
1999; Wilson and Grübler, 2011). Declining costs of technology
with cumulative experience in scaling them up can be modelled
either at the bottom-up scale (learning curves, e.g. McDonald and
Schrattenholzer, 2001, criticised by Nordhaus, 2014), or at the
aggregate scale (induced technical change, Edenhofer et al., 2006),
aspects reviewed by Löschel (2002). Meanwhile, mathematical
generalisations of diffusion dynamics have been suggested (e.g.
Bhargava, 1989; Grübler, 1990; Karmeshu et al., 1985; Mercure,
2012; Metcalfe, 2004; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010;
Saviotti and Mani, 1995) involving dynamic differential equations
similar to those in population growth mathematical ecology (i.e.
Lotka–Volterra systems, see Kot, 2001; Lotka, 1925; Volterra, 1939)
and demography (e.g. Keyfitz, 1977; Lotka, 1925). In combination
with evolutionary dynamics (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Saviotti, 1991) and evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998), this offers an artillery of powerful concepts at
the core of evolutionary economics (for a discussion, see Hodgson
and Huang, 2012). This emphasises innovation, diffusion and
speciation9 as a source of economic development and growth
(Metcalfe, 1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Schumpeter, 1934,
1942),the clustering of which is possibly responsible for ‘Kondra-
tiev cycles’ (Freeman and Louçã, 2001). These are broadly consis-
tent with the ‘multi-level perspective’ on technology transitions
described by Geels (2002, 2005). Furthermore, complexity and
path dependence emerge as key concepts to envisage technology
dynamics (Dosi and Metcalfe, 1991; Silverberg, 1988).
Intermediate scale models do exist that introduce investor/
consumer diversity in technology choices driving changes in
energy supply, end-use and emissions. For example, agent-based
models can be used to represent the multi-level perspective on
technology transitions (Köhler et al., 2009). Meanwhile models
using multinomial logit structures parameterised by survey data
provide a natural representation of diversity (e.g. the CIMS model,
Axsen et al., 2009; Mau et al., 2008; Rivers and Jaccard, 2006)
based on discrete choice theory (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).
Both approaches provide an appropriate replacement for the
neoclassical representative agent. However, even models with
detailed behavioural treatments do not currently have a complete
representation of empirically known technology diffusion patterns
as arise for instance in energy systems (Marchetti and
Nakicenovic, 1978), which stem from both the diversity of choice
(e.g. early, middle and late adopters, Rogers, 2010) and industrial
dynamics (i.e. industrial capacity growth and decline, e.g. Grübler
et al., 1999; Wilson, 2012). Conversely, evolutionary models of
technology innovation-diffusion (e.g. Safarzynska and van den
Bergh, 2012) do not have detailed representations of consumer
choice and diversity. But, critically, both principles have not yet
diffused widely into mainstream global scale integrated climate-
energy systems modelling used for informing climate policy
(where many models use exogenous diffusion rates, as discussed
by Wilson et al., 2013). Including these would generate an
improved methodological paradigm (i.e. the paradigm suggested
by Grübler et al., 1999; Wilson and Grübler, 2011), which we
propose here. In such a framework, optimisation as a source of
dynamic force and representative agent behaviour is replaced by
empirically known innovation-selection-diffusion dynamics with
behavioural diversity, which are not characterised by equilibria,
but feature complex dynamics.
2.2. Technology diffusion in FTT:Power
Emissions reductions in the energy sector can occur through
technology substitution, between technologies that produce the
same substitutable service (e.g. electricity and heat), through
behaviour and practice changes and through reductions in the
consumption of that service altogether. Technological change
occurs primarily at the average rate of replacement of existing
technology as it ages, which is inversely related to its life span.
However, notwithstanding lifetime considerations, the number of
new units of technology of a particular type that can be con-
structed at any one time can be larger if that industry is in a well
established position in the marketplace, with a large production
capacity, than if it is emerging. Evenwhen an emerging technology
is (or is made) very affordable, it may not always be accessible to
every investor making a choice between available options. Thus in
the analysis of the diffusion capacity of technologies, not only cost
considerations as seen by diverse agents come into play, but also a
limited access to technology and information, and these principles
form the core of FTT:Power (Fig. 1, see Mercure, 2012 for a general
model description, and Mercure, 2013 for a detailed mathematical
derivation).
Appendix A provides a mathematical derivation of the technol-
ogy dynamics at the heart of the FTT model, given here. Using the
variable Si for the generation capacity market share of a technol-
ogy, the rate at which shares of one technology type (j) can be
replaced by shares of another type (i) is proportional to
1. The rate at which units of technology j come to the end of their
working life, with death rate τ1j .
2. How many old units of j require replacement, a fraction Sj=τj of
the total share of replacements.
3. The rate at which the construction capacity for technology i can
be expanded, with growth rate t1i .
4. The market position of technology i, its share of the market
Si=ti.
8 Since investment resources are assumed to be used optimally (full employ-
ment), new investment in mitigation ‘crowds-out’ investment elsewhere.
9 Speciation in evolutionary theory means increasing diversity as species
increasingly subdivide into sub-species through mutation, adapting to changing
conditions.
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This implies the following dynamical equation:
ΔSi ¼∑
j
SiSjðAijFijGijAjiFjiGjiÞ
1
τ
Δt; ð1Þ
with matrix elements Aij expressing the rate of technology diffu-
sion from industrial dynamics, Fij expressing the probability of
investor preferences and Gij providing technical system con-
straints. τ 1 is the average sectoral rate of technology turnover.
This equation solves to the classic logistic function of time in the
special case of two interacting technologies, with diffusion rate
equal to AijFijGijAjiFjiGji. But generally it is complex and non-
linear, and generates slow uptakes at small penetration, then fast
diffusion at intermediate penetration, before a saturation near full
penetration. The three matrices determine together the pace of
change. This complex system cannot be solved analytically but is
straightforward to evaluate numerically using time steps. It
corresponds to the replicator dynamics equation in evolutionary
theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), equivalent to a Lotka–
Volterra set of equations of population dynamics for competing
species, also used in mathematical genetics as well as in evolu-
tionary economics (Saviotti and Mani, 1995): an ordering principle
emerging from technology interactions.
2.3. Learning-by-doing and path dependence
Profit-seeking investor choices Fij are driven by cost differences,
and these decrease over time as technologies diffuse and follow
learning curves (e.g. IEA, 2000; McDonald and Schrattenholzer,
2001), generating increasing returns to adoption. Learning-by-
doing cost reductions stem from the accumulation of technical
knowledge on production and economies of scale in expansion of
productive capacity for specific technologies. Technology costs are
taken here to apply in globalised firms and markets. Emerging
technologies have fast cost reductions (e.g. solar panels) while
established systems see very little change (e.g. coal plants).
Cost reductions are decreasing functions of cumulative invest-
ment, not time, and they do not occur if no investment is made.
Learning thus interacts with diffusion where it incentivises further
uptake, which generates further learning and so on, a highly
self-propagating effect which can lead to sudden technology
avalanches.
Such increasing returns to adoption give the crucial property of
path dependence to FTT:Power (Arthur, 1989). As technologies
diffuse following investor choices, the full landscape of technology
costs continuously changes, and investor preferences thus change.
These changes are permanent and determined by past invest-
ments, and therefore by the full history of the market, and
different futures emerge, depending on investment and policy
choices along the way. Technology costs and learning rates are
given in Mercure (2012), with more detail on the 4CMR website.
2.4. Natural resource use
The diffusion of power systems can only occur in areas where
energy resources are available, for instance windy areas for wind
power, or natural water basins and rivers for hydroelectric dams.
Higher productivity sites offer lower costs of electricity production
and tend to be chosen first by developers. Assuming this, the
progression of renewable energy systems development follows
increasing marginal costs of production for potential new systems
as only resources of ever lower productivity are left to use
(decreasing returns to adoption). This is well described by cost-
supply curves (e.g. as in Hoogwijk et al., 2004, 2009). For this
purpose, a complete set of curves was previously estimated from
combined literature and data for 190 countries and 9 types of
renewable resources (Mercure and Salas, 2012). These were
aggregated for the 21 regions of E3MG (Appendix B). This
produced 189 cost-supply curves that are used to constrain the
expansion of renewable systems in FTT:Power. The consumption of
non-renewable resources is, however, better represented using a
depletion algorithm, described next.
2.5. Fossil fuel cost dynamics
Non-renewable energy resources lying in geological formations
have an arbitrary value that depends on their cost of extraction,
but also on the dynamics of the market. A minimum price value
for the commodity is associated to their cost of extraction, above
which the extraction becomes profitable. These costs are, however,
distributed over a wide range, depending on the nature of the
geology (e.g. tar sands, ultra-deep offshore, and shale oil and gas).
Thus, given a certain demand for the commodity, the price is a
function of the extraction cost of the most expensive resource
extracted in order to supply the demand, and it separates what is
considered reserves from resources. As reserves are gradually
consumed, the marginal cost increases, generating a commodity
price increase that unlocks the exploitation of resources situated in
ever more difficult locations with higher extraction costs. For
example, tar sands became economic and saw massive expansion
above a threshold oil price of around 85–95$/boe (NEB, 2011).10
Thus, to any commodity demand path in time will correspond a
path dependent commodity price. The algorithm used here is
described with an analysis in Mercure and Salas (2013), relying on
data from Mercure and Salas (2012). In FTT:Power, this model is
used to determine fuel costs for fossil fuel and nuclear based
power technologies in global markets.
2.6. Modelling the global economy: E3MG
E3MG (and variant E3ME11) is an out-of-equilibrium macro-
econometric model of the global economy that has been used
widely for studies of climate change mitigation macroeconomics
(e.g. Barker et al., 2012, 2006; Barker and Scrieciu, 2010).
It evaluates the parameters of 28 econometric equations using
data from 1971 to 2010, and extrapolates these equations between
Fig. 1. Top flow of market shares from technology type j towards type i. Read from
right to left: in a unit of time, out of all decommissions of technology j, a proportion
is chosen by investors to be replaced by technology i, of which only a fraction can
be built given the share of production capacity that exists for this technology,
restricting the number of units of j that will successfully be replaced by units of i.
Bottom Schematic representation of Eq. (1), where changes in market shares of
technologies are equal to the sum of flows of shares between categories.
10 Including upgrading costs. Extraction costs may have changed since and
significant uncertainties exist around these values, which are allowed for in
the model.
11 For details of the econometric equations in both models, see the E3ME
website and manual at www.e3me.com.
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2010 and 2050. The model features a high resolution: its equations
are evaluated for 21 regions of the world, 43 industrial sectors, 28
sectors of consumption, 22 fuel users, and 12 fuel types. Sectors
are interrelated with dynamic input-output tables. The model does
not optimise economic resources but incorporates endogenous
growth and endogenous technical change. This is done following
Kaldor's theory of cumulative causation (Kaldor, 1957; Lee et al.,
1990, see also Löschel, 2002), where Technology Progress Indica-
tors (TPIs) are created by cumulating past investments I and R&D
spending using a relative time-weighting,12
TPIðtÞp ∑
1
a ¼ 0
eaτ1 lnðIðtaÞþτ2R&DðtaÞÞ: ð2Þ
Such TPIs are used in the industrial prices, international trade and
employment regressions. Lower prices incentivises higher con-
sumption, and thus industrial investment and R&D expenditures
for production capacity expansions, which lead to lower prices and
so on, producing a self-reinforcing cycle of cumulative causation of
knowledge accumulation. Including accumulated investment and
R&D makes E3MG non-linear, path-dependent and hysteretic, and
thus far from equilibrium. E3MG region definitions are given in
Appendix B.
2.7. Endogenous technical change and energy price–demand
interactions
The demand for electricity depends on its price, and it is well
known that in situations of high electricity prices, people may
strive to find more effective ways to use their income, preferring to
invest in more efficient technology, perceived as a worthwhile
tradeoff, or to simply reduce their consumption. When the
electricity supply technology mix changes, the minimum price at
which electricity can be profitably sold also changes, and with
such price changes, the demand for electricity changes. For
example, when carbon pricing or feed-in tariffs are used to ensure
access of expensive renewables into the grid, the price of elec-
tricity increases, affecting consumer demand and behaviour. Thus,
reductions in emissions originate from both a change in the carbon
intensity of the power sector and changes in the demand for
electricity. These aspects of energy economics are prominent in
this work, responsible for a significant fraction of our calculated
emissions reductions in scenarios of climate policy.
Electricity demand is modelled in E3MG using an econometric
equation that incorporates a contribution from spillovers from
investment and R&D spending in other sectors (Forssell, 2000, see
also the E3ME manual, Cambridge Econometrics, 2014). Since new
investments tend to involve technologies with higher energy
efficiencies and because the turnover of capital does not allow
return to old technology, here the TPI is formed by cumulating
positive increases in investment and R&D, which thus cannot
decrease.13 The energy demand equation takes the form
Xik ¼ β0ikþβ1ikYikþβ2ikPikþβ3ikTPIikþϵik; ð3Þ
where, for fuel i and region k, Xik is (in log space) the fuel demand,
Yik represents sectoral output, Pik relative prices. Economic feed-
backs between FTT:Power and E3MG occur with four quantities:
electricity prices, fuel use, power technology investments and tax
revenue recycling.
2.8. Emulating large models of the natural world
Detailed models of the Earth system are highly dynamical,
complex and computationally demanding. An efficient way to
integrate dynamic responses to inputs from other models is to
create reduced-order statistical representations of model outputs
‘emulators’ which can be used as surrogate models for coupling
applications. Emulators provide a method of analysing the other-
wise intractable cascade of uncertainty across multiple complex
systems. This approach was used here in order to obtain repre-
sentations of the planet's carbon cycle and its climate system, by
emulating data produced by the large models PLASIM-ENTS and
GENIE-1 (Foley et al., 2014). Appendix C provides a detailed
account of the procedure.
E3MG-FTT emissions in each scenario were fed to the carbon
cycle emulator, in order to obtain a trace of CO2 concentrations
within an uncertainty range. This trace with uncertainty was fed to
the emulator of the climate system in order to obtain a trace of
future global warming and climate change within an uncertainty
range, which thus cascades the uncertainty of both models.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Scenario creation and policy instruments
Ten scenarios of different electricity policy assumptions and
resulting technology mix and emissions up to year 2050 were
created with FTT:Power-E3MG, lettered a to j (Fig. 2). These all
lead to different futures for the global power sector and different
CO2 emission profiles. It is impractical to reproduce all the
information of these simulations in this paper, and therefore a
summary of the results is given here, the details having been made
available on the 4CMR website,14 where they can be displayed in
terms of the full resolution of 21 world regions and 24 power
technologies, for policy assumptions, electricity generation, emis-
sions and levelised costs. Four energy policy tools were explored:
carbon pricing/taxing,15 technology subsidies, feed-in tariffs (FiTs)
and direct regulations. Individual tools and various combinations
were explored, with a summary given in Fig. 2. By gradually
elaborating various policy frameworks, a scenario was found
where power sector emissions are reduced by 90% below the
1990 level, involving all four policy instruments used simulta-
neously. Emissions are fed to the carbon cycle and climate model
emulators GENIEem and PLASIM-ENTSem in order to determine
the resulting atmospheric CO2 concentration and average global
warming.
The nature of FiTs here is that access to the grid at a
competitive price is ensured (a price higher than the consumer
price), the difference being paid by the grid and passed on to
consumers through the price of electricity.16 The consumer price
of electricity is raised by just the amount that makes this
economically viable. The consumer price in the model is derived
from an averaged Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE),17
Pp∑GiLCOEi=∑Gi; ð4Þ
12 τ1 plays the role of knowledge depreciation while τ2 is a weighting
parameter for R&D.
13 According to the study performed by Forssell (2000), this describes historical
data better than the TPI given in Eq. (2).
14 http://www.4cmr.group.cam.ac.uk/research/FTT/fttviewer
15 Carbon pricing or taxing is not conceptually different in FTT, since the price/
rate is determined outside of the model. E3MG does not currently solve an
endogenous carbon price; it is fully exogenous.
16 FiT prices, although they could be made so, do not depend on capacity here
by design.
17 Using historical data, in order to preserve local taxation schemes, scaled to
change according to the rate of change of this technology average. For an exact
definition of our use of the LCOE, see Mercure (2012) or IEA (2010).
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Gi representing electricity generation. The LCOE as perceived by
investors when a FiT exists includes an ‘effective subsidy’ given by
the grid that covers the difference between the levelised cost of a
technology and the consumer price of electricity plus a margin
(investors here may be corporate or homeowners). In the case of
carbon pricing, the LCOE calculation that investors are assumed to
perform includes a carbon cost component, and the price of
carbon is passed on to consumers through the price of electricity.
Thus the price of electricity also increases with the carbon price
unless emitting technologies are phased out.
Technology subsidies are fractions of the capital costs of low carbon
technologies that are paid by the government, reducing the LCOE that
investors face. These are defined exogenously for every year up to
2050 and are phased out before then, after which it is hoped that the
technology cost landscape becomes permanently altered such that
technologies do not need to be indefinitely subsidised. Regulations
refer to controlling the construction of new units of particular techno-
logies, and can be used to phase out particular types of systems. When
a regulation is applied to a technology category, no new units are built
but existing ones are left to operate until the end of their lifetime.
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Fig. 2 summarises the result of the policy tools exploration.
Electricity generation by technology type is given in the series of
panels to the left of each pair, while emissions are given on the
right. The vertical dashed lines indicate the start of the simulations
in 2008, and trends to the left of this line are historical data from
the IEA (2012a, 2012b). The horizontal dashed lines indicate the
1990 levels of electricity demand and emissions. Dashed curves
correspond to the baseline values for comparison. In all scenarios
excluding the baseline, policy schemes generate both a reduction
of electricity consumption and emissions. Consumption reduces
due to increases in the price of electricity, through the energy
demand econometric equation of E3MG, which contributes sig-
nificantly to emissions reductions. All additional emissions reduc-
tions are due to changes in fuel consumption used associated with
changes of technologies. CO2 emission levels in 2050 with respect
to the 1990 level are given in percent values.
3.2. Climate policy for achieving 90% reductions in power sector
emissions
The baseline scenario (Fig. 2 panel a), which involves main-
taining current policies until 2050,18 leads to global power sector
emissions in 2050 of 30 GtCO2/y, 318% above the 1990 level, and
total emissions of 65 GtCO2/y. Cumulative emissions for the time
span 2000–2050 amount to 2321 GtCO2. According to the model,
this pathway is likely to commit the planet to a warming that
exceeds 4 1C above pre-industrial levels in around 2100 (Fig. 4 and
Section 3.3 below, with high probability), consistent with Zickfeld
et al. (2009) and Meinshausen et al. (2009).19 In view of finding
ways to reduce the power sector's share of these emissions and to
limit global warming, we searched areas of policy space for
effective abatement in the short time span.
The first option explored (panel b) was to use regulations to
prevent the construction of new coal power plants worldwide, the
systems with highest emissions (C1 ktCO2/GWh), unless they are
equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS). This results
mostly in a transfer from a coal lock-in to a gas lock-in, reducing
global emissions approximately to the 1990 level, largely insuffi-
cient for meeting the 2 1C target.
The second option was to use carbon pricing as a unique tool,
with different price values for different regions covering all world
regions shown in Fig. 3, between 100 and 200 2008$/tCO2 in 2050
(panel c) and between 200 and 400 2008$/tCO2 (panel d). This
measure, mostly generating reductions in electricity consumption
due to higher electricity prices, yields emissions of around 65%
above the 1990 level and to 9% below the 1990 level, respectively.
This modest impact suggests that carbon pricing on its own
requires very high carbon prices in order to generate significant
reductions, or that it is simply insufficient.20 However, as we show
now, combinations of policies achieve this much more effectively.
As a first combination of policies, FiTs (wind and solar) and
technology subsidies (all other low carbon technologies except
wind and solar) were introduced without carbon pricing (panel e),
of order 30–50% of capital costs for technology subsidies and feed-
in prices 5–15% above the electricity price for FiTs. The fine details
depend on regions and technologies, see the inset of Fig. 3 for a
world average or the data on our website for details. This
generates very modest uptakes of low carbon technologies and
thus small changes in emissions compared to the baseline, 276%
above the 1990 level. This is due to the low cost of producing
electricity using fossil fuels in comparison to all other technolo-
gies, in particular coal, and therefore without very high subsidies,
carbon pricing is necessary in order to bridge this cost difference.
Scenario f shows the use of carbon pricing up to 200$/tCO2 with
FiTs, the latter generating very little change over scenario c. Using
carbon prices of up to 200$/tCO2 in combination with technology
subsidies and FiTs in all world regions (panel g) yields emissions of
32% above the 1990 level, still insufficient. With carbon pricing of
up to 400$/tCO2 in combination with the same set of technology
subsidies and FiTs (panel h), reductions are much larger, 46% below
the 1990 level. The resulting power mix indicates how the impact
of policy combinations may be different than the sum of the
impacts of its components taken separately, offering significant
potential synergies.
A scenario was explored where only the developed world
applies the stringent climate policies of scenario h (panel i), in
which it is hoped that this generates enough investment to bring
the costs of low carbon technologies down into the mainstream,
thus becoming accessible to developing or under-developed coun-
tries. We see no noticeable uptake of new technology in these
countries, with coal based technologies and, as a consequence,
global emissions, remaining at 204% above the 1990 level.
A significant amount of the remaining power sector emissions
in scenario h reside in China (79%), where the lock-in of coal
technology is very difficult to break given the near absence of
alternatives (with the exception of hydroelectricity, which is
driven to its natural resource limits). The choice of investors thus
needs to be constrained at the expense of having to sell electricity
at higher prices. Therefore regulations were introduced in scenario
j in China that prevent the construction of new coal power stations
unless they are equipped with CCS. This additional policy forces
additional diversity in the Chinese technology mix, bringing down
global emissions to 90% below the 1990 level without early
scrapping. Note that it is possible that under different scenarios
of technology subsidies, FiTs and regulations, the carbon price
necessary for these emissions reductions could be lower, requiring
further investigations in this complex parameter space. Total
cumulative emissions for the time period 2000–2050 in scenario
j (in the baseline) are of 1603 Gt (2321 Gt), given that other sectors
do not change their technologies significantly, of which 350 Gt
(893 Gt) originate from the electricity sector alone.
3.3. Climate change projections
Global emissions from all sectors in scenarios a to j were fed
into the carbon cycle emulator (GENIEem) in order to calculate the
resulting CO2 concentrations with their uncertainty range. The
latter were then supplied to the climate system emulator (PLASIM-
ENTSem) in order to find out their climate change impacts with
climate uncertainty, cascading the uncertainty of the carbon cycle
into that of the climate system. Fig. 4, top panel, displays global
CO2 emissions for all the scenarios in Fig. 2, including however all
fuel combustion emissions from endogenous sources in the model
as well as exogenous trends of emissions for non-fuel-related
sectors (e.g. land use), obtained from the EDGAR database. While
the changes modelled include those in power sector emissions,
they also include modest changes in other sectors (e.g. industry)
occurring due to carbon pricing for all fuel users subject to the
emissions trading scheme and due to changes in economic activity.
In order to run the climate model emulator, emissions were
required up to 2100. In complex models such as E3MG or climate
models, uncertainty increases with time span from the present.
18 Carbon pricing for the EU-ETS only, reaching 80 2008$/tCO2 in 2050.
19 Extrapolating this emissions trend linearly to 2100, where cumulative
emissions in 2100 could be 49000 GtCO2, or 2500 PgC, leads to at least a 75%
probability of exceeding 4 1C, especially if emissions do not stabilise by then,
according to Zickfeld et al. (2009). We find a 5% probability of warming of less than
3.6 1C, see below.
20 Standard analyses using marginal abatement cost curves assume an instan-
taneous implementation of mitigation measures, and thus are able to have carbon
prices equal to their cost.
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This currently makes convergence more difficult in E3MG beyond
2050, especially in scenarios of stringent climate policy which may
lead the model to venture near the boundary of the behavioural
space defined by its econometric relationships prescribed by data
prior to 2010. However the primary interest in this work resides in
assessing the impacts of near term policy action on the future state
of the world. Since the baseline scenario emissions trend is very
nearly linear, it was extrapolated with a polynomial to 2100, as
well as those of scenarios e and i. All other scenarios feature
stabilised emissions in 2050 (b, c, d, f, g, h and i), and thus their
2050 emissions values were assumed to be maintained constant
up to 2100.
The middle panel of Fig. 4 shows the resulting atmospheric CO2
concentrations, with uncertainty given as a blue area. It was
observed that scenario a already reaches a median value of
533730 ppm in 2050 while scenario j reaches 485720 ppm.
This is above the generally agreed threshold of 450 ppm for
maintaining warming below 2 1C. These concentrations with
uncertainty were fed to the climate model emulator (Fig. 4,
bottom). For the baseline scenario, this yielded global warming
median temperature changes of between 3.91C and 6.7 1C over
pre-industrial levels with a median value of 5.0 1C21 when using
the median concentration and only the climate model uncertainty,
and between 3.6 1C and 7.2 1C with the same median when
cascading the carbon cycle uncertainty into that of the climate
model. This therefore could in principle exceed as high as 7.2 1C of
warming with a low probability.
Meanwhile, the electricity decarbonisation scenario j yields
warming values of between 2.9 1C and 4.8 1C, median of 3.6 1C,
with carbon cycle uncertainty only and between 2.6 1C and 5.2 1C,
same median, with both carbon cycle and climate model uncer-
tainties. The electricity sector decarbonisation scenario thus has a
negligible probability of not exceeding 2 1C of warming. This
indicates that the decarbonisation of the power sector by as much
as 90% is insufficient if other sectors such as transport and industry
are not specifically targeted by climate policy, in order to avoid
‘dangerous’ climate change.
3.4. Learning cost reductions and energy price dynamics
The uptake of low carbon technologies generate learning cost
reductions that alter permanently the technology cost landscape.
Fig. 5 shows world averages of bare technology costs (upper
panels) for the baseline and mitigation scenario j, regionally
weighted by electricity generation, excluding technology subsi-
dies, the carbon price and FiTs. These values, when including
policy, drive investor choices in both the baseline (left) and the
mitigation (right) scenarios. Roughly speaking, decreases stem
from learning-by-doing cost reductions while increases originate
from increasing natural resource scarcity with development.
While the cost of PV panels decreases in the baseline scenario
mainly due to deployment in Europe, it decreases by more than
half its 2008 value in the mitigation scenario where they benefit
from FiTs everywhere. Meanwhile, onshore wind power does
come into the mainstream in many regions of the world in the
mitigation scenario and does not necessitate support all the way to
2050, where the value of the wind FiTs become near zero or even
negative, in which case the policy is dropped altogether. In other
regions, wind power is limited by resource constrained decreasing
capacity factors and corresponding increasing costs. Other tech-
nologies, such as geothermal or wave power (not shown), see very
little uptake in this particular mitigation scenario and therefore
little cost reductions.
The costs of producing electricity, defined as share-weighted
average LCOEs, are given for 6 aggregate regions in the lower
panels of Fig. 5. Such a marginal cost is used in E3MG to construct
electricity prices in 21 regions, of which the changes alter
electricity consumption. These are different between regions,
stemming from different technology and resource landscapes,
where lower marginal costs correspond to higher shares of coal
based electricity. Significant increases are observed in the 90%
decarbonisation scenario in all regions, reflecting the cost of the
energy transition passed-on to consumers.
The marginal costs of fossil fuels are calculated using estimates
of reserves and resources, described in Section 2.5, and are not
highly affected by changes in policy in these scenarios. In both
scenarios oil and gas costs increase significantly up to 2050 in a
similar way, but these increases are dampened by the massive
accession to unconventional fossil fuel resources (oil sands, heavy
oil and shale gas). This analysis will be expanded elsewhere. Coal
costs are only moderately affected by changes in demand due to
large coal resources. The cost of natural uranium ore is stable until
2035 where an increase is observed, generated by increasing
scarcity. At this level of consumption, uranium resources are
projected to run out before 2100 unless technology changes (e.g.
thorium reactors, see IAEA, 2009; Mercure and Salas, 2012, 2013).
3.5. Global economic impacts of a 90% reduction scenario
The macroeconomic impact of scenarios a and j in E3MG is a
vast subject beyond the scope of the present paper, and will only
be summarised here. We find that decarbonising the electricity
sector by 90% has moderate economic benefits, generating addi-
tional employment, real household income and increases in GDP
of between 1 and 3% (depending on the region) in comparison to
scenario a, broadly consistent with previous similar analyses
performed with the model (Barker et al., 2006; Barker and
Scrieciu, 2010). This is due to two opposing forces acting against
one another: the introduction of low carbon technologies force
increases in electricity prices (as seen in Fig. 5), lowering real
household disposable income, while low carbon technology pro-
duction generates further employment in various industrial sec-
tors, increasing household income. These were observed to
roughly cancel each other out, which is possible as long as labour
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21 A temperature change of 0.6 1C between pre-industrial levels and 2000 was
assumed, see Meinshausen et al. (2009) and NASA data at http://data.giss.nasa.gov/
gistemp/tabledata_v3/GLB.TsþdSST.txt.
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and capital (investment) resources can be made available (Barker
and Scrieciu, 2010).
In our scenarios, carbon pricing generates government income
larger than government spending on technology subsidies, the rest
being redistributed to households in the form of income tax
reductions, increasing further their disposable income. The result-
ing impacts are therefore of increased household income and
consumption in comparison to the baseline and thus higher GDP.
It is to be noted however that there are winners and losers in this
picture both in terms of sectors and world regions, which depends
on howmuch they rely on activities of the oil, gas and coal sectors.
In this non-equilibrium demand-led perspective, our assump-
tions about capital and labour markets are consistent with our
assumptions of energy markets, in that these resources are not
assumed to be currently used optimally and their markets do not
automatically produce optimal outcomes. This means that excess
finance as well as unemployment exist in the model. This contrasts
with the results of many other economic models used to assess the
economic impacts of climate change mitigation (e.g. see the model
comparison in Edenhofer et al., 2010), which tend to give
moderate negative impacts. The main difference stems precisely
from assumptions over economic resources: in general equili-
brium theory, displacing economic resources that are optimally
used can only lead to effects detrimental to the economy (crowd-
ing out effects). However, unemployment does exist in the world
economy, and it is not generally agreed that investment resources
are currently used to their utmost potential (Grubb et al., 2014).
Further research into this issue is crucial and requires modelling
the global financial sector, absent in equilibrium theory,22 but also
not specifically treated in E3MG.
3.6. Local scenarios of power generation and emissions
It proves instructive to analyse electricity technology land-
scapes in individual regions of the world in FTT:Power-E3MG, for
policy analysis and for better understanding the nature of tech-
nology lock-ins and the restricted local ability to change in a
diffusion perspective. This is presented in Fig. 6 for six key regions
or countries: North America, Europe, China, India, Brazil and the
Rest of the World, which have different electricity landscapes
stemming from differing energy policy strategies and engineering
traditions historically, as well as natural resource endowments.
National strategies, reflecting local engineering specialisation
related to technology lock-ins, is a natural outcome of this model's
structure (Eq. (1)), which reproduces the better ability of dom-
inating industries to capture the market despite costs.
Renewable energy systems are more exploited in Europe than
anywhere else in the world, except in Brazil, where hydroelec-
tricity dominates. Europe also sees the most diverse electricity
sector, with large amounts of wind power already in the baseline
scenario, predominantly in northern Europe and the British Isles,
large amounts of nuclear power in France, and some solar power
in Germany. Coal fired electricity is mostly phased out before 2050
in the 90% scenario, resulting in significant emissions reductions.
North America features higher use of fossil fuels for power
production than Europe. However, while E3MG projects a larger
potential for consumption reductions, large opportunities for
diversification also emerge with significant potentials of renew-
able energy. Bioenergy with CCS generates a large contribution to
American emissions reductions.23
China and India have very low technology diversity and impor-
tant fossil fuel lock-ins. The amount of coal used in China in the
baseline is responsible for 10 out of 30 Gt of global emissions in
2050. Diversification proves difficult given the scale of the rate of
increase in consumption; breaking the coal lock-in requires regula-
tions in China to phase out building new coal generators. Large scale
diffusion of renewables is slow and retrofitting CCS to coal gen-
erators offers a useful alternative. Electricity demand reductions are
very large, which requires further investigations for fuel poverty
and other social implications.
In Brazil, even though hydroelectricity is not the least expen-
sive resource, it nevertheless dominates, another form of technol-
ogy lock-in. This is typical of a national engineering tradition
dominated by a technology for decades.24 Brazil is projected to
persist in developing its hydropower capacity despite higher costs
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Fig. 4. (Top) Total global anthropogenic emissions in all ten scenarios of Fig. 2.
(Middle) CO2 concentrations, the blue area representing the 95% confidence range.
(Bottom) Global warming with respect to the pre-industrial level, the inner blue
area delimitating the 95% confidence range of the climate model, and the outer
blue area showing the combined carbon cycle and climate model uncertainties. The
top of the blue areas indicate the uncertainty boundary for the highest concentra-
tion and warming scenario, while the bottom of the blue area refers to the
uncertainty boundary of the lowest concentration and warming scenario. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this figure caption, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
22 Rational expectations in equilibrium theory mean that agents with perfect
foresight never default on their debts, which implies a non-existence of risk in
finance.
23 Note that negative emissions from biomass combustion and sequestration
could involve a transfer of emissions from the power to the land use sectors, if
important land use changes take place, or if fossil fuels are used in the production
of biomass. This should be investigated using consistent land-use modelling.
24 A similar situation exists in France with nuclear power, in Canada with
hydroelectricity, in China with coal-fired power stations, and originates from either
or both an abundance of resources and historical energy policy strategies that have
shaped the local expertise, becoming a ‘tradition’ despite cost considerations.
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and a decreasing potential, until the cost becomes prohibitively
high and only less productive hydro resources remain.
The rest of the world includes predominantly countries where the
diversity of existing technologies is low, and persists in this direction.
It features large amounts of oil use for electricity despite high oil
prices, due to restricted access to technology or fossil fuel subsidies,
which are not successfully phased out despite being the least cost-
effective way of producing electricity. Coal based electricity makes
the dominant contribution to emissions in the baseline, the rest
divided between oil and gas fired power stations, for a total of 12 out
of 30 Gt of global emissions in 2050 in the baseline. In the mitiga-
tion scenario, a significant additional hydroelectricity potential is
developed, and coal is replaced by gas turbines, which are eventually
retrofitted with CCS.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
4.1. Synergy between policy instruments
This paper shows that in a coupled energy–economy–environ-
ment model that does not assume economic equilibrium or use
technology cost-optimisation, the impact of policy instruments
can be different if used individually or in combination: the impact
of combined policy packages does not correspond to the sum of
the impacts of individual instruments. Thus significant synergies
exist between policy instruments. In this regard we showed that in
a technology diffusion perspective, carbon pricing alone is not
likely capable of delivering sufficient emissions reductions unless
it is unrealistically high; it must be combined with technology
subsidies, FiTs and regulations. This can be ascribed largely to the
inertia of diffusion, and contrasts with the neoclassical environ-
mental economics view that pricing the externality generates the
desired outcome most efficiently (e.g. Anthoff and Tol, 2013;
Nordhaus, 2010).25 Our model results indicate that relying on
carbon pricing alone even up to 400 2008$/tCO2 is likely to lead to
a status quo in the technology mix while delivering very expensive
electricity to consumers. Similarly, technology subsidies and FiTs
on their own have little impact unless they are combined with
sufficiently high carbon pricing.
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Fig. 5. (Top panels) LCOE per technology excluding carbon pricing, technology subsidies and FiTs, for the baseline (a) and the mitigation scenarios (b). (Bottom panels)
Marginal cost of electricity production for 6 world regions, for the baseline (c) and the mitigation scenarios (d).
25 Note that the concept of equating a marginal abatement cost to a social cost of
carbon in a path-dependent perspective is ambiguous: several prices can be
assigned to both quantities depending on the context and history.
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We furthermore suggested that particular combinations of policy
instruments can produce such strong synergy that reductions of
electricity sector emissions of 90% by 2050 (61% of 2000–2050
cumulative baseline power sector emissions) become possible without
early scrapping of electricity generation capital. Such strong reductions
could be complemented by additional reductions in other emissions
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intensive sectors with additional cross-sectoral synergies: transport,
industry and buildings, warranting further work in this area. If early
scrapping is allowed, these reductions could be achieved even faster,
but would most likely involve higher costs. Finally, different combina-
tions of the policies analysed here could also lead to 90% emissions
reductions, for example with lower carbon prices and higher technol-
ogy subsidies, FiTs and/or more regulations.
4.2. The effect of global knowledge spillovers on technology costs:
individual vs global coordinated action
Technology systems typically face a vicious cycle: established
technologies thrive because they are established, and emerging
technologies see barriers to their diffusion due to the lock-in of
established technologies. This is the case unless an emerging technol-
ogy is a radical improvement over the incumbent, or it benefits from
sufficient external support. Emerging technologies require investment
and sales in order to benefit from improvements and economies of
scale: repetition, trial and error enables entrepreneurs to improve their
products. They thus require a continuous flow of funds from sales or
external investment in order to survive until their products take off on
their own in the market. In the long run, these investments may or
may not generate a return, and are thus risky. Without any investment
to bridge the ‘technology valley of death’, however, they may become
failed innovations.
Given estimated learning curves of power systems, a certain
additional capacity of emerging technologies such as wind
turbines and solar PV panels must be deployed in order to bring
down their costs to a competitive level set by incumbent
technologies. As we find here, this additional capacity is very
large, and cannot be deployed by a single nation such as Germany
or even the whole of Europe, for the rest of the world to benefit.
In contrast, we find that only a concerted global climate policy
effort can bring down costs to manageable levels and bring new
power technologies into the mainstream, opening very large
renewable energy potentials such as that of solar energy. Such
a concerted effort can significantly and permanently alter the
global landscape of power technology costs and availability. We
stress that all countries of the world can benefit from learning
cost reductions that originate from investments and sales occur-
ring in various locations. This problem therefore possesses the
features of a classic free-rider and collective action problem,
where international coordination is the only way by which these
cost reductions can take place. Emerging or developed nations
cannot simply ‘wait’ for climate policy in other nations to
generate diffusion and enough learning cost reductions for new
technologies to become competitive: without their involvement
they might potentially never become competitive. If the power
sector is to decarbonise by 2050, all countries are most likely
required to make a contribution to the development of the
renewables industry.
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Appendix A. Substitution dynamics
The decision-making process by diverse agents can be
expressed with probabilistic pairwise comparisons of options.
Investors do not all face similar situations and do not weigh
different aspects in the same way, which cannot possibly be
enumerated specifically in a model. However, when dealing with
large numbers of instances of decision making, there will be
majority trends in investor choices, who may be assumed, if all
relevant considerations are quantified into costs, to be seeking cost
minimisation with the goal of profit maximisation for their own
respective firms.26 Data-derived probability distributions may thus
be used in order to avoid enumerating the details of all situations
faced by investors, and where a particular technology is on
average more profitable to use than a second one, there usually
exist specific situations where the reverse turns out to be true.
This provides a crucial simple representation of diversity in
decision-making. In this form, this is a binary logit model (see
Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).
The statistical trend of investor preferences may be expressed
as a matrix Fij expressing the relative fractions of investor choices
between two technologies i and j out of a set. For example, if
Fij ¼ 70% and Fji ¼ 30%, then investors faced with these two
options would choose 70% of the time technology i and 30% of
the time technology j. This can be derived using probability
distributions for technology costs (derived from recent investment
data, a form of revealed preferences),27 calculating the number of
instances where technology type i is seen as less expensive than j.
In the spirit of discrete choice theory, the probability that technol-
ogy j is perceived less expensive than technology i, and the
converse, are
FijðΔCÞ ¼
Z 1
1
FjðCΔCÞf iðCÞ dC; ð5Þ
FjiðΔCÞ ¼
Z 1
1
FiðCþΔCÞf jðCÞ dC; ð6Þ
where F(C) is a cumulative cost distribution function while f(C) is a
cost distribution density, while ΔC is an average cost difference.
Innovation generates new technologies that live in niches that
protect them from the wider market. From those niches, in
appropriate changes of market conditions, can emerge and diffuse
new socio-technical regimes (Geels, 2002, 2005). After the inno-
vation phase, at the level of diffusion, technologies enter what we
termed the ‘demographic phase’ (Mercure, 2013), because the
derivation follows standard population dynamics for competing
species, as in Kot (2001). The four building block arguments
enumerated in Section 2.2 are summarised as follows.
(1-2) The rate at which units of technology come to the end of
their lifetime stems from survival analysis, where a cumulative
probability of failure yields a survival function ℓjðaÞ of age a. The
number of units retired from operation δj, and the number
remaining Nj, relate to how many were built a years in the past
26 Profit maximisation at the firm level, rather than cost minimisation at the
whole system level, is the crucial difference between this bottom-up investor
behaviour approach the common top-down cost-optimisation. See for instance
Nelson and Winter (1982).
27 Here, we have used a published survey (IEA, 2010). More details are given in
Mercure (2012).
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ξjðtaÞ, with life expectancy τj:
NjðtÞ ¼
Z 1
0
ξjðtaÞℓjðaÞ da; ð7Þ
δjðtÞ ¼
Z 1
0
ξjðtaÞ
dℓjðaÞ
da
daC
Nj
τj
; τj ¼
Z 1
0
ℓjðaÞ da: ð8Þ
(3-4) The rate at which units of technology get produced
depends on available production capacity, and production capacity
is built out of profits on sales, leading to a virtuous cycle that
gradually builds up. A ‘birth’ function mi(a) can be defined that
enables to determine the growth of production capacity δNi from
historical sales ξiðtaÞ with re-investment rate Ri:
δNiðtÞ ¼ Ri
Z 1
0
ξiðtaÞmiðaÞ daC
Nj
ti
; ð9Þ
with a growth rate determined by
ti ¼
τi
RiΦi
; Φi ¼
Z 1
0
miðaÞ da; ð10Þ
a growth time constant much shorter than the life expectancy
(ti{τi, births occur RiΦi faster than deaths).
Finally, constraints of the power system prevent some types of
technology from dominating.28 These can be expressed with a
second matrix Gij, stopping investments that lead to stranded or
unused assets due to technical problems (grid stability).
Using the equation in Fig. 1, and normalising unit numbers into
market shares, we calculate the flow of market shares from
technology of type j towards category i:
ΔSj-ip
Si
τi
 
ðFijGijÞ
Sj
tj
 
ΔtpSiSjAijFijGijΔt:
Since, according to the binary logit, the reverse choice is allowed,
there is a simultaneous reverse flow of substitutions
ΔSi-jp
Sj
τj
 
ðFjiGjiÞ
Si
ti
 
ΔtpSiSjAjiFjiGjiΔt;
the net exchange between categories i and j is
ΔSij ¼ SiSjðAijFijGijAjiFjiGjiÞ
Δt
τ
: ð11Þ
Adding up flows between all possible technologies j and category i
yields the main Eq. (1).
Appendix B. Model regions
See Table B1.
Appendix C. Climate system emulation
To assess climate impacts requires models of both the carbon
cycle and the climate. Here we use simplified, statistically derived
representations (emulators) of these two systems as described in
more detail by Foley et al. (2014). No direct feedback from climate
to economy is implemented, but our approach does allow for
spatially and temporally resolved analysis of climate impacts,
including the effects of uncertainty in the climate system.
The carbon cycle is represented by GENIEem, an emulator of
the Grid Enabled Integrated Earth system model (GENIE1 Holden
et al., 2013). It takes as inputs a time series of anthropogenic CO2
emissions produced by FTT:Power-E3MG and a scenario of non-
CO2 radiative forcing (including the effects of CH4, N2O, halocar-
bons, aerosols and O3) based on the ‘representative concentration
pathway’ (van Vuuren et al., 2011) that most closely matches the
baseline used in this study. GENIEem calculates the extent to
which CO2 emissions remain in the atmosphere and produces a
time series of atmospheric CO2 concentration as output. Uncer-
tainty in the carbon cycle is captured by varying the internal
parameters of GENIE-1, resulting in an ensemble of 86 possible
future atmospheric CO2 concentration profiles.
GENIEem, in turn, provides inputs to the climate-system model
PLASIM-ENTSem (Holden et al., 2014), an emulator of the PLAnet
SIMulator (Fraedrich, 2012) – coupled to the Efficient Numerical
Terrestrial Scheme (Williamson et al., 2006). Non-CO2 forcing is,
again, prescribed. Uncertainty is captured by varying PLASIM-ENTS
internal parameters, resulting in a 188-member ensemble of
decadally averaged seasonal climate variables.
The combination of the two emulators in the context of this
work, with combined uncertainty analysis, is described in detail by
Foley et al. (2014). First, PLASIM-ENTSem is forced with the
median of the GENIEem ensemble, and the median, 5th and
95th percentiles of warming from the resulting PLASIM-ENTSem
ensemble are calculated; these bounds, therefore, reflect war-
ming uncertainty due to parametric uncertainty in the climate
model alone.
Next, PLASIM-ENTSem is forced with the 5th percentile CO2
concentration from the GENIEem ensemble. The 5th percentile
of warming from the resulting PLASIM-ENTSem ensemble is
calculated. Finally, PLASIM-ENTSem is forced with the 95th
percentile CO2 concentration from the GENIEem ensemble, and
the 95th percentile of warming from the resulting PLASIM-
ENTSem ensemble is calculated. These two simulations form a
second set of bounds, reflecting warming uncertainty due to
parametric uncertainty in the climate model and the carbon
cycle model.
Table B1
World regions in E3MG-FTT.
E3MG-FTT
region
Member countries
1 – USA USA
2 – Japan Japan
3 – Germany Germany
4 – UK UK
5 – France France
6 – Italy Italy
7 – Rest of EU-15 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
8 – EU-12 Czech, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta,
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania
9 – Canada Canada
10 – Australia Australia
11 – OECD NES Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey
12 – Russia Russia
13 – Rest of
Annex I
Belarus, Croatia, Ukraine
14 – China China
15 – India India
16 – Mexico Mexico
17 – Brazil Brazil
18 – NICs South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand
19 – OPEC Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
UAE, Venezuela
20 – Rest of the
World
All other countries not specified elsewhere
21 – Indonesia Indonesia
28 For instance related to their supply properties or variability (e.g. as with
wind power).
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